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In a climate system that is indifferent about where mitigation is carried out, the
logic of comparative advantages favors abatement locations in developing and rapidly
industrializing countries. There is evidence, however, that citizens of industrialized
countries who voluntarily fund climate mitigation activities are not indifferent about
the mitigation location. In our artifactual online experiment, subjects located in a
European Union member state took a dichotomous choice between a cash prize
and the verified mitigation of one metric ton of CO2. The treatment condition
varied the location of the mitigation activity between the European Union and
developing countries. We test whether the location impacts on the probability that
the mitigation activity is chosen, harnessing between- and within-subject variation
in our panel data. Our evidence shows that subjects responded to the location being
made salient, but, contrary to previous concerns, were indifferent between mitigation
sites in the EU or developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Climate change presents humanity with an environmental problem of unprecedented
nature and scale (Nordhaus 1993, Stern 2006). The scale of this problem has mobi-
lized many people in industrialized countries not only to voice their support for public
policies aimed at emissions reductions (Aldy et al. 2012, Bechtel and Scheve 2013). A
considerable share of these populations also shows a willingness to voluntarily provide
mitigation services as a global public good (Diederich and Goeschl 2014, Lindman et al.
2013, Lo¨schel et al. 2013, Aldy et al. 2012).
A widely acknowledged feature of the climate change problem is the fact that the
climate system is essentially indifferent as to where on Earth mitigation activities are
carried out. From an economic perspective, this source indifference has significant impli-
cations. It is synomymous with uniformly mixed pollutants and implies that the gains
from spatial specialization in providing abatement are maximal because pollution dam-
ages do not vary with the spatial configuration of abatement. Differently put, the global
division of labor in providing climate change mitigation can be allowed to be determined
entirely by countries’ comparative advantage in mitigation costs. These costs differ
significantly across the globe. Empirical estimates put the international differences in
marginal abatement costs for CO2 across the globe up to two orders of magnitude (Beach
et al. 2015, Morris et al. 2012, Criqui et al. 1999). This is driven by differences in sectoral
composition and gradients in technological efficiency between countries, with relatively
cheap mitigation in industrializing and relatively expensive mitigation opportunities in
already industrialized countries. The empirical evidence on international trade in emis-
sion allowances under the UNFCCC confirms this pattern (Dechezlepreˆtre et al. 2009).
The prevailing mitigation cost heterogeneities therefore offer significant scope for har-
nessing the logic of comparative advantage in order to provide the global public good of
mitigation provision. On the other hand, the same cost heterogeneities also mean that
deviations from the logic of comparative advantage impose excess aggregate mitigation
costs.
Would people in industrialized countries that voluntarily contribute mitigation efforts
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want to deviate from the logic of comparative advantage because they have locational
preferences over mitigation activities? Several possible reasons for the presence of lo-
cational preferences have been pointed out in the literature. On narrowly economic
grounds, individuals may, ceteris paribus, prefer mitigation closer to home because they
believe that GHG mitigation provides some amount of localized co-benefits (West et al.
2013, Bollen et al. 2009).1 If individuals care more about some group of localized co-
beneficiaries than about another, then mitigation closer to the location of the favored
group could be preferred. Most commonly, this preference would be suspected to take
the form of a ‘home’ bias (Buchan et al. 2009). Another economic reason is that individ-
uals could believe that problems of compliance and trustworthiness mitigate or perhaps
even reverse the comparative advantage of developing countries in mitigation activities.
If subjects believe that mitigation projects in developing countries have little additional-
ity (Hayashi and Michaelowa 2013) or suffer from fraud (Lovell 2010, Gillenwater et al.
2007), this will subtract from the expected productivity of carrying out mitigation in lo-
cations with lower institutional quality compared to industrialized countries. Behavioral
factors provide another set of possible reasons for locational preferences. For example,
a transfer of resources for mitigation activities could run counter to a desire to restrict
benefits to a group with which the donor feels greater affinity, a phenomenon known
as ’social discounting’ (Strombach et al. 2014, Jones and Rachlin 2006). Social identity
could therefore give rise to locational preferences that favor provision closer to home.
Another behavioral mechanism could be that individuals have an offset motive that is
prejudiced towards offsetting one’s own emissions (Kotchen 2009). Carrying out mitiga-
tion closer to home could also be construed as benefitting from a demonstration effect
(Shang and Croson 2009, Feldstein and Clotfelter 1976), signalling e.g. for EU citizens
the European Union’s perceived global leadership in climate policy (Sarasini 2009). Rea-
sons for preferring mitigation activities to be carried out ceteris paribus in developing
countries mainly focus on redistributive motives: To the extent that locating mitigation
activities there generates local income effects, a decreasing marginal utility of money
could be argued to justify a transfer of resources there (Dutschke and Michaelowa 2006).
1Reduction in GHG emissions typically target the fossil energy sector that is also responsible for the
emission of other pollutants such as sulfur oxides and nitrous oxides.
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Previous and concurrent evidence on locational preferences for public goods produc-
tion offers an inconclusive picture both in general and in the particular context of climate
policies. In the general public goods literature, studies of multi-level public goods games
generally find that under laboratory conditions, subjects exhibit a significant prefer-
ence for restricting the benefits of public goods provision to individuals with whom they
share a common group affiliation (Blackwell and McKee 2003, Fellner and Lu¨nser 2014,
Chakravarty and Fonseca 2017). This finding is, however, only partially supported by
field evidence (Buchan et al. 2009, Gallier et al. 2017). In the more specific context
of climate change mitigation, a choice experiment conducted in Mexico (Torres et al.
2015) examines the willingness to pay for offset activities and find greater support for
mitigation activities located geographically closer to the subject. Two studies concur-
rent to ours report on incentivized experiments: In Baranzini et al. (2016), around 300
student subjects from Geneva, Switzerland allocate strictly more of their endowment
to mitigating in a Nicaraguan forestry-based carbon offset project than in a Swiss one,
where the Nicaraguan project yields three times as much mitigation per unit of endow-
ment.2 Buntaine and Prather (2017) ask US subjects recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) to make a real donation to the Greenhouse Gas Protocol program of a US
NGO, the World Resource Institute (WRI). In one experiment, 1,214 subjects make a
dichotomous choice between keeping an unexpected $0.50 windfall or donating it to a
mitigation project located in the US, India, or China, depending on the random assign-
ment. In a second experiment, 2,656 subjects allocate a possible $20 prize win between
three recipients: themselves, a US mitigation project or a rapidly-industrializing country
project.3 In contrast to Baranzini et al. (2016), they find that without an information
intervention, US subjects are significantly more likely to donate to mitigation activities
located in the US in the dichotomous choice experiment and donate more to US-based
activities in the allocation task experiment.4
2The Nicaraguan project receives up to three-quarters of the endowments on average in a treatment
that emphasizes the productivity differences while an emphasis either on the trustworthiness or local
co-benefits fails to affect the relative allocation between locations.
3The treatments vary by information provided, with no information in the baseline and treatments
with ordinal information about relative mitigation productivity (’most’, ’somewhat’, ’least’ cost effective)
and about local co-benefits.
4Relative information about cost effectiveness reduces this bias, leading to convergence in the propen-
sity to donate in experiment 1 and a reversal in the amounts donated in experiment 2.
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The ideal experimental setting for testing whether individuals have locational prefer-
ences over the mitigation site for their voluntary public goods provision would involve a
large number of subjects who are distributed across a wide space and who are offered the
opportunity to provide a perfectly uniform mitigation amount for the same cost. For
each individual, the experimenter would then exogenously vary the location of where
the perfectly uniform mitigation activity would be carried out, observe variations in the
subjects propensity to choose mitigation, and then recover the propensity to provide
the public good as a function of the spatial relationship between the subjects location
and the site of provision. This relationship could capture geographical distance, juris-
dictional borders, cultural and economic heterogeneity, etc. and provide an insight into
how these factors affect the propensity to provide the public good. In the real world, the
experimenter faces several obstacles to implementing the ideal experiment, key among
them the free choice of where mitigation is carried out, how costly it is, and the perfect
uniformity of mitigation activities. The strategy of our online experiment is to offer
solutions to these key obstacles that approximate this ideal setting: We offer a total of
3,940 individuals in a European Union member state a dichotomous choice between a
cash prize between e 2 and e 100, randomly assigned, and the verified mitigation of one
metric ton of CO2 emissions, controlling for fixed effects. The core results come from
the comparison of the choices of 1,585 subjects in two treatment variations that make
the location of the mitigation activity explicit. In one treatment (EU), subjects are
explicitly informed that the verified mitigation of one metric ton of CO2 will be carried
out within the European Union, from where the subject’s own emissions originate; in
the other treatment (DC), they are informed that the verified mitigation of one metric
ton of CO2 will be carried out in a developing country. In a consecutive choice, the
location of the mitigation activity is switched. Assignment to the different treatments
is randomized. On this basis, we test for differences in the propensity to undertake a
voluntary mitigation action of uniform climate impact between the EU treatment and
the DC treatment. Finally, we also compare these results to the choices of 2,354 sub-
jects that take the same decision in a similar treatment (NE) in which the EU location
of mitigation is introduced in neutral language and not made salient.
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Summarizing our findings, the decisions of our Internet-representative sample do not
exhibit locational preferences between a mitigation site in the European Union and one
in a developing country: There were no statistically significant differences between the
EU and the DC treatment in subjects’ propensity to choose CO2 mitigation over the cash
prize. This result holds both in a between-subjects and a within-subjects analysis and
is robust to the inclusion of numerous controls. The price elasticity of the propensity to
provide mitigation is very similar, with some between-subjects evidence that mitigation
in developing countries is less sensitive to cost than mitigation in the European Union.
Compared to the NE treatment, which introduced the location neutrally and with little
salience, we find that being explicit about the location of where a subject’s voluntary
mitigation activities will be carried out made the average subject more likely to choose
mitigation over the cash prize. Failing to observe locational preferences is therefore not
driven by a lack of salience. Given our experimental control over the cost of mitigation for
the individual, the verified uniformity of mitigation activities across EU and developing
country sites, and the Internet-representative nature of our sample, we interpret this
finding as evidence that across the population, locational preferences need not stand in
the way of realizing the gains from comparative advantage in climate change mitigation.
The next section describes the experimental design and subject sample. Section 3
then presents the main results, which we discuss in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design and subject sample
2.1 Experimental design
We conducted a simple experiment involving two consecutive binary choices between
receiving a cash award and providing an actual carbon emissions reduction. For each
of the two choices, the cash award, representing the opportunity cost of the emissions
reduction, was drawn randomly ranging, in increments of e 2, from e 2 to e 100. The
upper bound of the distribution corresponds to estimates of the maximum marginal
abatement cost per ton of CO2 equivalent (McKinsey & Company 2010, Kesicki and
Ekins 2012). The carbon emissions reduction amounted to one ton of carbon dioxide
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Table 1: Two-stages counterfactual design of treatment administration
Experimental group
Choice 1 2 3
1 EU DC NE
2 DC EU other
# of subjects: 788 797 2,355
in each choice task and was implemented using one of two instruments, depending on
the treatment. In the EU and NE treatments, the emissions reduction was facilitated
by purchasing and deleting one EU emissions allowance (EUA) under the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Deleting one EUA lowers the total cap of the trading scheme
(1.856 billion tons for the relevant trading period), and hence emissions, by one ton. In
the DC treatment, the emissions reduction was facilitated by purchasing and deleting
one Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) based on the Clean Development Mechanism
of the Kyoto Protocol. CER are tradable carbon offsets generated by emission reduction
projects in developing countries which cut down on emissions compared to the business-
as-usual scenario. In order to minimize concerns regarding additionality, the certitificate
was of the “Gold Standard” quality.5
Each of the two subsequent choices was subject to a different treatment. The counter-
factual assignment of treatments (Table 1) allows us to analyze between-subjects differ-
ences separately as well as to take advantage of the panel structure of the data. Subjects
were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups which determined the se-
quence of treatments they faced. In group 1, the EU treatment preceded the DC treat-
ment. In group 2, the sequence was in reverse order. In group 3, subjects faced the NE
treatment in their first choice and were administered some unrelated other treatment in
their second choice.6 Hence, only independent first choices can be compared between-
subjects between all three treatments while for the EU and CD treatments, a full panel
is obtained.
5The question of additionality refers to the problem how reliable are estimates of the business-as-usual
emission path that would have occurred in absence of the carbon-offset. This has led to the critique of
heterogenous “qualities” of CER. See, for example, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org.
6The fact that there were three other unrelated treatments for the second choice of group 3 explains
why about three times as many subjects were assigned to this group than to groups 1 and 2.
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Treatments were administered on two computer screens in the experiment, the in-
formation screen and the subsequent decision screen. For all choices in all treatments,
the information screen introduced the offered choice between a cash award and a one
ton CO2 emissions reduction and included a succinct explanation of how choosing the
emissions reduction, by deleting either an EUA or Gold Standard CER, would result in
a real, reliable, and verifiable reduction in CO2 emissions. Each choice was framed as
choosing the prize for a lottery in which winners’ choices would be implemented.7 In all
treatments, the information screen concluded by advising subjects on the pure public
good character of providing an emissions reduction and informing them about the odds
of the lottery. All instructions about the award choice were kept short and simple and
refrained from giving extensive background information about climate change.8 The
subsequent decision screen described how each option, if chosen, would be implemented
in the experiment and elicited the choice.9 The two prize alternatives, including the
subject-specific amount of the cash award and the full name of the emission reduction
option were then presented in random order and subjects had to check the preferred
option.
Treatments differed in how the emissions reduction option was presented on both
screens. While the EU treatment text emphasized that emission cuts would take place
domestically within the EU and hence, would concern emissions to which the subject’s
7We used a between-subjects random incentive system (RIS) in order to limit total cost of the exper-
iment (Grether and Plott 1979, Starmer and Sugden 1991, Lee 2008). The RIS was between-subjects
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Abdellaoui et al. 2011, Baltussen et al. 2012) with odds of 1:50 that the
subject’s choice was realized. Between-subjects and within-subject RIS have been subject to examina-
tion for possible biases. While between-subjects introduces noise and decreases risk aversion, there is
less evidence of a systematic bias for simple tasks (Cubitt et al. 1998, Baltussen et al. 2012). In one
example, between-subjects RIS has been shown to affect behavior in dictator games (Sefton 1992) while
for ultimatum games, behavior was unaffected (Bolle 1990).
8Researchers have taken opposing stands as to the extent to which information should be provided
about an unfamiliar good that is to be valued or for which demand is to be revealed by study partic-
ipants. While the best practice in contingent valuation generally calls for providing respondents with
extensive information, it has also been argued against giving potentially choice-relevant information
around the time of the contribution decision (Arrow et al. 1993). In our case, we expected our partic-
ipants to overwhelmingly accept the empirical veracity of climate change and its anthropogenic cause
in the form of greenhouse gas emissions based on prior survey evidence for German citizens (European
Commission 2008). In this respect, we expect that describing only a few key items that differed between
treatments when describing the choice would, if any, introduce a bias in favor of finding differences
between treatments.
9Subjects that chose the cash award would have the value credited to their personal account at the
polling company while those who chose the emissions reductions could verify that the emissions reduction
had been carried out through certification presented on a university website.
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personal energy use contributes, the DC treatment emphasized that emission cuts would
be achieved by an emission reduction project in a developing country that would guaran-
tee social and environmental side-benefits for the local population. In contrast to these
two framings, the NE treatment, although employing EUAs like the EU treatment, made
the location of the reduction less salient than the EU and DC treatments. In particular,
the NE treatment did not include the addition “within the European Union” to the name
of the emissions reduction option on both screens and did not speak about “domestic
emissions [...] to which your personal energy use contributes” in the explanatory text
of the information screen (cp. Appendix 5 for a complete wording of the information
screens highlighting differences).
2.2 Protocol and subject sample
The Internet experiment ran in two sessions in May and July 2010 over the course
of 15 days in total. We used the infrastructure of a large Internet polling company
(YouGov) to recruit and pay an Internet-representative10 subject sample of 4,079 voting-
aged Germans11 and to administer our experiment. The recruitment of subjects followed
the standard routine of the polling firm in which panel members are invited via an email
message to proceed to the poll. The introductory screen then explained, as common
with the pollster’s regular surveys, the thematic focus of the poll (CO2 emissions and
climate change), the expected duration (ten minutes), and the payment (in form of a
lottery with a prize worth up to a three-digit Euro figure).12 Following the introductory
screen, there was a filter screen to focus on German subjects and passing subjects were
administered the information and decision screens of the two consecutive prize choices.
Participants then faced another sequence of six to nine computer screens, depending on
their decisions, that contained follow-up questions on climate change mitigation, EUAs
and carbon offsets, and elicited subjects’ sociodemographic characteristics. Answers
revealed 139 subjects who either objected to the EU ETS as a proper method to reduce
10The sample was Internet-representative with respect to age, gender, and region of residence.
1174% of Germans regarded themselves as citizens of the European Union at the time of the experiment
(Eurobarometer 2012 Standard Eurobarometer 77 / Spring 2012).
12At the time of the experiment, the polling company usually incentivized panel members participating
in polls through either a piece-rate reward of approximately e 1 for 20 minutes expected survey time or
random (lottery) prizes, e.g. in the form of shopping vouchers.
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Table 2: Fraction of choices of emissions reduction
Experimental group
Choice 1 2 3 EU vs. DC NE vs. EU NE vs. DC
EU-DC DC-EU NE-other
1 20.1% EUA 19.4% CER 16.2% EUA p = 0.76 p = 0.01 p = 0.04
2 30.1% CER 25.7% EUA – p = 0.05 – –
Notes: p-values report two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on the distribution of choices.
emissions or said they distrusted the experiment itself and who are subsequently excluded
from the analysis. The remaining sample of 3,940 subjects completed the experiment
with a median completion time of five minutes.13 After all responses were collected,
winners were drawn and notified as described on the decision screens. Prior to the
experiment, a set of pre-tests and a pilot experiment with 200 economics students at
Heidelberg University helped testing and refining the online implementation and the
wording of the instructions.
3 Results
3.1 Reduction within the EU vs. reduction in a developing country
Table 2 presents descriptive results on the choice of the emissions reduction in each choice
and treatment. Comparing independent first choices, we observe that the fractions of
choices in favor of the emission reduction are virtually identical at about 20% in both
the EU and CD treatments (p = 0.76). Being offered a second choice increases decisions
in favor of the reduction in both treatments. However, with repetition, a gap opens:
Being offered a developing country CER instead of the EUA increases the propensity to
choose the reduction by about 3.7 percentage points more than being offered an EUA
instead of an CER. This leads to a somewhat significant difference in propensities in the
second choice (p = 0.05) that is, however, not independent from what subjects saw in
their first choice.
In order to disentangle the effects of treatment from those of repetition, individual ex-
13Mean completion time was 80 minutes. The difference between mean and median is largely driven
by outliers who availed themselves of the opportunity to leave the survey and continue hours or days
later.
10
perimental prices, and other potential covariates, we employ probit regressions in Table
3. Columns (1) and (2) confine the analysis to between-subjects comparisons based on
first-round choices only. Controlling for experimental price as well as time and location
fixed effects for the choices confirms the previous observation of no significant differences
between treatments. Columns (3) to (5) then harness the doubled sample size from two
choices per subject and employ the random-effects probit estimator to account for the
panel structure of the data. From the increased power, we observe experimental con-
trols for repetition and price to become highly significant determinants of the choice in
column (3), with signs as expected. The specification in column (3) assumes the effects
for repetition and price to be uniform across experimental groups. Thus, estimating out
a uniform effect for repetition opens the possibility for the treatment variable to deliver,
echoing the observed difference in choice 2 in Table 2. In contrast to the other exper-
imental variables, the treatment variable becomes only marginally significant, however
(p = 0.08). Nevertheless, it presents itself as a candidate for indicating a preference for
the reduction in a developing country. An alternative explanation for the observed differ-
ence other than a treatment effect would be that the effect of being given a second choice
is not uniform across the two experimental groups. In this case, the significant coefficient
in column (3) would be an artifact of the sequence of choices, i.e. either being offered an
EUA instead of a CER or vice versa, but not a genuine treatment effect. Likewise, the
treatment effect might surface for average prices but differ in sign for particularly high or
low prices.14 In column (4), we therefore allow the effects for repetition and price to vary
between experimental groups. Due to the interaction with repetition, the treatment ef-
fect naturally disappears. However, column (4) does not deliver a significant interaction
of the repetition effect with experimental group to support the alternative explanation.
Likewise, there is no music in the interaction between price and treatment. In column
(5), we therefore include individual controls based on sociodemographic characteristics.
The reason is that in all specification up to here, we have included time and location
fixed effects at the resolution of experimental day, daytime, and region of residence.
Plausibly, randomization may have been not perfect across experimental groups within
14This would be an effect paralleling the findings in Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) for the relationship
of price and altruism.
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these cells. In result, although we return to assuming uniform coefficients for repetition
and price across treatments, the DE treatment does no longer differ significantly from
the EU treatment (p = 0.33). This finding calls for the inclusion of unobserved individ-
ual controls or, ideally, to exploit within-subject variation only and employ an individual
fixed-effects estimator. In our sample, there are 522 subjects who switch their decision
between the two choices. Unfortunately, there is no consistent and unbiased conditional
fixed-effects probit estimator. However, the potential bias from using the unconditional
fixed-effects probit model works in our favor since the bias is, if any, away from zero
(Greene 2004). Despite this potential bias in favor of a significant estimate, column (6)
renders the DC treatment indicator as insignificant (p = 0.24) while other experimental
variables deliver again highly significant estimates (p < 0.0005). We take these results of
Table 3 as evidence that despite the power of a sample with over 3,000 observed choices
and between- as well as within-subject variation, the difference between the EU and DC
treatments regarding the propensity to choose the emissions reduction is essentially zero.
3.2 A “neutral” vs. salient treatments
As pointed out earlier, the incomplete counterfactual design for the NE treatment (due
to unrelated other treatments administered to the second choice of experimental group 3)
restricts us to between-subjects comparisons of the first choices only. Table 2 suggests
that the propensity to choose the emissions reduction in the EU and DC treatments
significantly exceeds that in the NE treatment by about 3.9 and 3.2 percentage points,
respectively. Probit regressions in column (1) of Table 4 confirm these findings. Control-
ling for experimental price and time-location fixed effects in column (2) yields coefficient
estimates for the EU and DC treatments that translate into marginal effects of a 4.2 and
3.6 percentage points, respectively, higher propensity in favor of the emissions reduction
compared to the NE treatment. Relaxing the assumption of a uniform price effect across
treatments in column (3) suggests that the differences between treatments particularly
manifest for high prices. While at the lowest price in the sample (e 2), the marginal
effects for the EU and DC treatment indicators are insignificant (p = 0.47 and p = 0.65,
respectively), the estimates at the highest price (e 100) are considerably larger (9.8 per-
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Table 3: EU vs. DC
Between-subjects Between- and within- Within-
subjects subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DC -0.011 0.150 0.137* -0.019 0.085 0.148
(0.074) (0.148) (0.079) (0.248) (0.086) (0.125)
Price -0.001 0.001 -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
DC × Price – -0.003 – -0.001 – –
(0.003) (0.003)
Choice 2 – – 0.526*** 0.312* 0.550*** 1.048***
(0.083) (0.176) (0.091) (0.128)
Choice 2 × DC – – – 0.426 – –
(0.309)
Time-loc. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes –
Indiv. ctrls. – – – – Yes –
Indiv. FE – – – – – Yes
Constant -0.949*** -1.032*** -1.360*** -1.262** -2.601*** 1.162
(0.262) (0.270) (0.508) (0.523) (0.736) (0.894)
N 1549 1549 3102 3102 2460 522
Log-likelihood -760.968 -760.180 -1426.525 -1425.449 -1124.445 -267.188
χ2 26.091 27.667 99.809 101.233 104.169 189.270
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.018 – – – 0.262
Notes: Columns (1)-(2) report probit regressions of the choice of emission reduction in
the first lottery. Columns (3)-(5) report random-effects probit regressions of both choices.
Column (5) reports an unconditional fixed-effects probit model. “Time-location fixed effects”
include indicator variables for location (Bundesland), day, and daytime (morning, afternoon,
evening, night) of a subject’s choice. “Individual controls” include sociodemographic variables
of age, gender, years of education, income, and the number of children in the household.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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centage points with p = 0.002 for the EU, 5.2 percentage points with p = 0.07 for the
DC) than at the mean price of e 51.24 (4.2 percentage points with p = 0.01 for the EU,
3.7 percentage points with p = 0.02 for the DC).
Table 4: NE vs. EUA and CER
(1) (2) (3)
EU 0.146** 0.162*** -0.097
(0.060) (0.061) (0.126)
DC 0.124** 0.140** 0.048
(0.060) (0.061) (0.117)
Price – -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
EU × Price – – 0.005**
(0.002)
DC × Price – – 0.002
(0.002)
Time-loc. FE – Yes Yes
Constant -0.985*** -0.866*** -0.796***
(0.031) (0.169) (0.173)
N 3940 3852 3852
Log-likelihood -1831.518 -1763.613 -1760.764
χ2 8.131 78.912 84.611
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.022 0.023
Notes: Probit regressions of the choice of emission
reduction in the first lottery. “Time-location
fixed effects” include indicator variables for loca-
tion (Bundesland), day, and daytime (morning,
afternoon, evening, night) of a subject’s choice.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
4 Discussion
The core result of locational indifference among subjects in our paper differs from some,
but by no means all previous evidence that such locational differences exist. This should
not surprise, however: Evidence on multi-level public goods provision, for example, has
found that locational group biases are less prevalent in the field than in the laboratory
(Gallier et al. 2017, Buchan et al. 2009) and decline with the degree of globalization in
the subjects’ economy (Buchan et al. 2009), which is high in the EU.
There are also methodological differences between our approach and that of other
current studies of locational preferences in the mitigation context. One is the choice of
14
experimental subjects: Baranzini et al. (2016) use a sample of around 300 students from
the canton of Geneva in Switzerland and Buntaine and Prather (2017) use AMT subjects
from different US states. Our study, on the other hand, is based on YouGov’s Internet-
representative sample from Germany, an EU member state. Another difference is that
we compare the same amount of verfied mitigation, one metric ton, across individuals
and randomly vary the cost of providing this mitigation in both locations. Baranzini
et al. (2016) also choose verified mitigation activities, but design a setting in which the
developing country is always more than three times as productive in verified mitigation
activities as the alternative in a different Swiss canton. Buntaine and Prather (2017)
design a donation task in which they do not control the amount of the verified mitigation
productivities, while productivity information is provided in a separate treatment on a
qualitative basis. This complicates in both cases the answer to the question whether
subjects perceive the different mitigation locations as perfect substitutes since subjects
are never offered the same amount of verified mitigation for the same price in two different
locations.15
Differences in results can also be explained by other differences in the choice task.
Our approach opts for the format of single-bounded dichotomous choice, similar to ex-
periment 1 of Buntaine and Prather (2017), which minimizes well-known behavioral and
cognitive biases. The design by Baranzini et al. (2016) employs a two-step choice in
which subjects first decide on the share of their endowment to contribute to mitigation
in general and in a second step choose between the two locations. Experiment 2 in
Buntaine and Prather (2017) involves a continuous allocation task between three op-
tions. Two-step procedures will, almost by design, lead to differences in results from
dichotomous choice tasks since the latter emphasizes the external margin of the decision
which the two-step approach minimizes. This is even more pronounced in three options
tasks, which are known not only to increase donations, but also lead to fuzzier results
as subjects exhibit a tendency to avoid zero allocations (Cherry and Dickinson 2008,
15A conceivable complication of implementing the ceteris paribus condition across locations could be
subjects’ awareness of significant cost differentials, leading to field price censoring. However, subjects are
unaware of the field price of mitigation activities both in general (Diederich and Goeschl 2017) and in
a locations-specific context (Buntaine and Prather 2017, Baranzini et al. 2016). Diederich and Goeschl
(2017) apply a battery of tests to detect field price censoring using the same subject pool and design
and find no evidence.
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Bernasconi et al. 2009).
A last point concerns robustness. Ex-post controls for observable socio-demographic
and attitudinal characteristics of subjects are possible and can yield interesting in-
sights.16 To provide the basis for a more rigorous test of robustness, our design in-
cludes within-subjects evidence that allows us to control for unobserved variation. Both
between- and within-subjects analyses return evidence of locational indifference, a con-
sistency that strengthens the result.
5 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was a simple question: “The climate system is indifferent
as to the location of voluntary mitigation activities. Are people?” The motivation for
this question are the significant economic ramifications of deviating from the least-cost
geography of mitigation activities, dictated by comparative advantage, in the presence of
locational preferences among those willing to pay for emissions reductions and existing
evidence that such preferences may favor mitigation not to be carried out in far distant
locations. Our artefactual field experiment with around 4,000 subjects varies, for resi-
dents of a European Union member state, whether the location of mitigation activities
is made salient or not and whether the salient location is in the European Union or in a
developing country, approximating the ceteris paribus condition within the constraints
of a field setting.
Our headline findings are twofold: The decisions of our Internet-representative sam-
ple do not exhibit locational preferences between a mitigation site in the European Union
and one in a developing country: There were no statistically significant differences be-
tween the EU and the DC treatment in subjects’ propensity to choose CO2 mitigation
over the cash prize. This result holds both in a between-subjects and a within-subjects
analysis and is robust to the inclusion of numerous controls. There are also no significant
differences in the price elasticity of the propensity to provide mitigation. Compared to
the NE treatment, which introduced the location neutrally and with little salience, we
16Extensive additional econometric analysis on such covariates was carried out and is available on
request.
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find that being explicit about the location of where a subject’s voluntary mitigation
activities will be carried out made the average subject more likely to choose mitigation
over the cash prize. Failing to observe locational preferences is therefore not driven by a
lack of salience. Given our experimental control over the cost of mitigation for the indi-
vidual, the verified uniformity of mitigation activities across EU and developing country
sites, and the Internet-representative nature of our sample, we interpret this finding as
evidence that across the population, locational preferences need not stand in the way of
realizing the gains from comparative advantage in climate change mitigation.
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Table 5: Information screens EU and DC treatments
A. EU treatment:
In the following, we will inform you about one of the two lotteries. You may
choose between two different awards. For this lottery, these are:
XY Euro in bonus points
or
the reduction of carbon (CO2) emissions by 1 ton within the European Union
How does the reduction of the CO2 emissions work in this lottery? We will use
a reliable opportunity provided by the EU emissions trading system: We will purchase
and delete an EU emissions allowance for you. Power plants and other large industrial
installations need emissions allowances within the EU in order to be entitled to emit CO2.
Since there is only a fixed overall number of allowances in place, deleted ones are no longer
available to cover emissions. Domestic emissions in Germany and the other EU countries,
to which your personal energy use contributes, will decrease by exactly one ton from
one deleted allowance.
Because of the way in which CO2 mixes in the air, it does not matter for the effect
on the climate where on the globe CO2 emissions are reduced. What counts is only total
emissions worldwide.
In the lotteries, 100 winners will be randomly selected out of about 5,000 participants.
B. DC treatment:
In the following, we will inform you about one of the two lotteries. You may choose
between two different awards. For this lottery, these are:
XY Euro in points
or
the reduction of carbon (CO2) emissions by 1 ton through an emissions reduction
project in a developing country
How does the reduction of the CO2 emissions work in this lottery? We will use a reliable
opportunity. We will support a certified local emissions reduction project in a
developing country for you, e.g., for biogas, wind power, or energy efficiency.
This will abate 1 ton of CO2 in the developing county. We will only choose
projects with the highest possible certification mark: the CDM Gold Standard.
Such projects have to be carried out such that they benefit the local population
(e.g., by hiring local employees) und in a particularly environmentally friendly
manner.
Because of the way in which CO2 mixes in the air, it does not matter for the effect
on the climate where on the globe CO2 emissions are reduced. What counts is only total
emissions worldwide.
In the lotteries, 100 winners will be randomly selected out of about 5,000 participants.
Notes: Highlighted in bold are differences in phrasings between treatments. In the EU treatment, we
highlight differences to the NE treatment. In the DC treatment, we highlight differences to the EU
treatment.
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Table 6: Information screen NE treatment
NE treatment:
In each of the two lotteries, you may choose between two different awards. These
are:
A cash award in points
or
the reduction of carbon (CO2) emissions by 1 ton
How does the reduction of the CO2 emissions work? We will use a reliable opportunity
provided by the EU emissions trading system: We will purchase and delete an EU emissions
allowance for you. Power plants and other large industrial installations need emissions
allowances within the EU in order to be entitled to emit CO2. Since there is only a
fixed overall number of allowances in place, deleted ones are no longer available to cover
emissions.
Emissions in Germany and other EU countries will decrease by exactly one ton from
one deleted allowance.
Because of the way in which CO2 mixes in the air, it does not matter for the effect
on the climate where on the globe CO2 emissions are reduced. What counts is only total
emissions worldwide.
In the lotteries, 100 winners will be randomly selected out of about 5,000 participants.
The following two lotteries may differ in the awards offered as well as in the payoff proce-
dures.
Notes: Highlighted in bold are differences in phrasing to the EU treatment.
Figure 1: Information screen of the EU treatment
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Figure 2: Decision screen, EU treatment
Figure 3: Information screen of the DC treatment
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Figure 4: Decision screen, DC treatment
Figure 5: Information screen of the NE treatment
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